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Abstract 
In the realms of AI and science fiction, agents are fully-autonomous systems that can be 
perceived as acting of their own volition to achieve their own goals. But in the real world, the 
term “agent” more commonly refers to a person that serves as a representative for a human 
client and works to achieve this client’s goals (e.g., lawyers and real estate agents). Yet, until 
the day that computers become fully autonomous, agents in the first sense are really agents in 
the second sense as well: computer agents that serve the interests of the human user or 
corporation they represent. In a series of experiments, we show that human decision-making 
and fairness is significantly altered when agent representatives are inserted into common 
social decisions such as the ultimatum game. Similar to how they behave with human 
representatives, people show less regard for other people (e.g., exhibit more self-interest and 
less fairness), when the other is represented by an agent. However, in contrast to the human 
literature, people show more regard for others and increased fairness when “programming” 
an agent to represent their own interests. This finding confirms the conjecture by some in the 
autonomous agent community that the very act of programming an agent changes how people 
make decisions. Our findings provide insight into the cognitive mechanisms that underlie 
these effects and we discuss the implication for the design of autonomous agents that 
represent the interests of humans.   
 
 
Keywords:  Agent Representatives, Decision making, Fairness, Strategy Method 
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1. Agent (Representative): a person who acts for or represents another 
2. Agent (Cause): a person or thing that produces a particular effect or change 
‐ Cambridge Dictionary 
 
1. Introduction 
In the 2009 movie Up in the Air, George Clooney plays a “corporate downsizer.” He 
is hired by companies to handle the uncomfortable task of offering their employees an 
ultimatum: take this early retirement package or risk termination. Thus, he serves as an agent 
of the company, representing the company’s interests, while allowing it a measure of ethical 
distance from an uncomfortable social situation. Research in the social sciences illustrates 
that agents in this sense, as third-party representatives, can deflect blame when actions are 
seen as unfair or ethically problematic, and lead people to make different decisions than they 
might if they interacted face-to-face [1-3]. 
Within AI, the term “agent” is often used in a different sense – as a fully-autonomous 
system that can be perceived as acting of their own volition to achieve its own goals – yet 
agents in this sense are really agents in the representative sense as well: autonomous agents 
ultimately serve the interests of the human user or corporation they represent. Thus, it is 
natural to ask if using agent representatives change the nature of decisions between people in 
the same way that human representatives alter these social decisions. In this paper, we 
investigate this by examining two related questions. On the one hand, we ask whether people 
behave differently when they interact with an agent representative (i.e., an autonomous agent 
that represents the interests of another person), compared with how they would act towards 
that person directly (i.e., would they be more or less willing to accept a retirement package 
from a robotic George Clooney). On the other hand, we ask whether people “program” their 
autonomous representatives to behave differently than they might behave directly (i.e., would 
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a company be less willing to fire their employees if they couldn’t use an autonomous 
“corporate downsizer”?). 
We examine these questions in the context of typical social decision making settings. 
These are collective action situations in which there is a conflict between individual and 
collective interests [4], [5]. In other words, these are situations that are neither purely 
cooperative nor purely competitive. They arise across a wide range of real-world political, 
economic and organizational situations and agent representatives are being proposed for 
many of these situations including helping people reach optimal decisions in complex 
negotiations and economic settings, and helping business leaders improve decision quality, 
enforce company policy, and reduce labor cost [6-8]. These situations are studied through 
game theory and laboratory experiments using stylized games that capture the essence of 
real-world predicaments, such as the ultimatum game, prisoner’s dilemma or trust game. A 
key finding from years of research is that human behavior differs systematically from game 
theoretic predictions, and that that these differences are explained (in part) by the human 
tendency to follow social norms such as fairness [9].  
In this paper, we examine how the introduction of agent representatives changes the 
fairness of human decisions in two standard social decision making games: the ultimatum 
game and the impunity game. These games study fairness under different social dependency 
and incentive structures, thus providing a good test of the generality of our findings. We 
adopt the conventional definition of fairness used in behavioral economics: i.e., people are 
deemed fair if they behave consistently with a norm of fairness. In the context of an 
ultimatum game, this means they make more equitable offers – i.e., an even 50-50 split of 
resources – to their counterparts and reject inequitable offers made to them.    
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Research on human representatives suggests that both sides of a social transaction will 
show less regard for fairness when an interaction is mediated by human agents [1], [10]. For 
example, Bazerman and colleagues1 discuss how major pharmaceutical companies prefer to 
act through intermediaries when dramatically raising the price of a drug. They further show 
this is an effective strategy, as consumers react with less anger than if the company had raised 
the price directly. More broadly, the use of intermediaries is one of many ways of increasing 
the “psychological distance” between parties in a social exchange. For example, findings 
suggest that fairness concerns are reduced when decisions are separated in time and space 
[11-15], factors that are likely to occur when interacting via computer agents. 
Do agent representatives change decisions in similar ways?  Although this question 
has not been considered explicitly, two lines of research inform our approach to this question. 
First, an extensive body of research has examined the extent to which people treat computers 
and robots similarly to how they treat people (e.g., [16]). Although such studies typically 
describe agents as acting on their own behalf, or leave the other implicit, users likely assume 
the system represents the interests of the scientists that created it, and thus directly relates to 
how they might respond to an agent representative. Second, several researchers have 
considered whether the act of programming an agent might alter the way people make social 
decisions [17-23]. Although this research is directed at a very different question (namely, will 
these programs behave the same as real people in social simulations?), it speaks directly to 
the question of how people might act through an agent representative.  We briefly review 
these lines of work before formulating our experimental hypotheses. 
                                                 
1 Gino, F., Moore, D., & Bazerman, M. (2008). See no evil: When we overlook other people's unethical 
behaviour. Harvard Business School NOM Working Paper No. 08-045. 
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1.1. Are People Fair to Autonomous Agents? 
Several studies in human-computer and human-robot interaction show that people 
follow human social norms when interacting with autonomous agents [16], [24-28]. For 
instance, people establish rapport with computer agents [29] and robots [30], react to their 
emotional displays [31], follow and respond to rules of politeness [25], [32], favor in-group 
and disadvantage out-group machines [26], [33], and apply social and racial stereotypes [27], 
[28]. The implication from this research, thus, is that, in social decision making, people 
would be likely to show the same kind of social considerations – including fairness – with 
autonomous agents as they do with humans.  
Although these studies emphasize that people apply social norms to agents, they 
rarely examined the strength of this tendency. Other lines of research suggest this tendency is 
relatively weak and largely shaped by beliefs about the “mind” behind the machine [34-37]. 
To test this, several studies manipulated whether people believe the agent is autonomously 
controlled by a computer program or is a puppet – or avatar – that is manipulated in real-time 
by another person. The advantage of such studies is they hold the appearance and behavior of 
the agent constant but manipulate the mere belief of what controls this behavior. These 
studies show that people still follow social norms with autonomous systems, but this 
tendency is strongly attenuated [38-44]. People engage less in mentalizing – i.e., inferring of 
other’s beliefs, desires and intentions – with agents than with avatars in the exact same 
economic settings, for the exact same financial incentives [38-41]; they experience less 
emotion with agents [42-44], are less willing to follow orders [45] and, are less concerned 
about projecting a positive impression [46]. Most relevant to the current study, people 
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consistently showed reduced fairness with autonomous agents than with avatars in the 
dictator, ultimatum, and public goods games [43].   
1.2. Are People Fair to Agent Representatives? 
Collectively, the previously-mentioned findings suggest that people will be less fair to 
autonomous agents that appear to act on their own behalf than they would to an agent that is 
controlled moment-to-moment by a person (i.e., an avatar). However, how would they 
behave towards an autonomous agent that was acting on behalf of another person (i.e., an 
agent representative)? Would they treat it more like an autonomous agent or more like an 
avatar? Although these previous results don’t speak directly to this question, they often leave 
unstated if other humans benefit from the autonomous agent’s actions or if the agent is 
described as acting on its own behalf (e.g. [42]); thus, participants might reasonably assume 
that the agent represents some person’s interests. For example, if a participant is giving 
money to a robot in an ultimatum game, presumably they don’t think the robot will spend its 
earnings. Therefore, we argue, these findings suggest that people behave less fairly towards 
autonomous agents despite assuming it represents the interests of human actors. 
Consequently, these findings comparing autonomous agents to avatars, suggest people will 
treat agent representatives more similarly to how they treat autonomous agents and, thus, less 
fairly than they would avatars. 
Research in the social sciences also demonstrates that increasing perceived 
psychological distance can lead people to treat others less fairly [1], [11-15]. This previous 
work studied the effects of psychological distance by manipulating perceived anonymity, 
social distance, temporal distance, and physical distance. Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith [11] 
showed that in conditions of full anonymity – i.e., participants could not be identified by their 
counterparts or the experimenters – people offered much less than when anonymity was not 
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preserved. Researchers also showed that people offered more to counterparts that were closer 
in their social networks (e.g., friends) [12, 13]. Pronin, Olivola, and Kennedy [14] 
demonstrated that temporal distance also affected decision making; in their studies, people 
showed larger psychological distance between their future selves, who were treated the same 
as different people, than their present selves. Finally, various researchers have shown that 
physical proximity can lead to increased cooperation [15]. These findings are relevant 
because interacting with an agent representative can lead to increased perceived 
psychological distance to the counterpart and, thus, less fairness. 
In sum, the findings in these studies comparing autonomous agents to avatars and the 
research on the impact of psychological distance on fairness lead to our first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: People will show reduced fairness when interacting with agents that 
represent others than when interacting directly with humans. 
1.3. Are People Fair when “Programming” an Agent Representative? 
The aforementioned experiments examined how people treat agents that represent 
others' interests, but how might people treat others when acting through an agent? Would 
they instruct the agent to act as they themselves would in the same situation? Here, we 
motivate two competing hypotheses about how people might behave. 
A line of research addressing this question is work on peer-designed agents [17-20]. 
These are autonomous agents programmed by human users to represent their interests in 
social tasks. This research arose from a desire to reduce the cost of designing and testing 
mechanisms that involved human decision-makers. The idea was that if people build agents 
to solve some social task (e.g., negotiating or playing game-theoretic games), their programs 
would reflect their own decision-making and could be used as a proxy for their own decisions 
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in computer simulations. For example, a company could use such simulations to decide on a 
pricing mechanism for their electronic market place [20]. This quickly raised the question, 
however, as to whether people would truly program agents to act in the same way they would 
act “in the moment.” 
Several studies have tested whether such agent representatives actually behave the 
same way as the programmer would in a real-time interaction, and findings are mixed. Some 
research finds no differences between the decisions of human actors and the decisions of their 
agents across domains as varied as economic exchanges and parking simulations [17, 18]. 
Yet, other studies suggest that people may program their agents to behave less fairly [19-23]. 
Particularly relevant to our work, Grosz et al. [19] showed that, in a negotiation setting, 
people were more demanding when acting through a representative than when engaging 
directly with others. Elmalech, Sarne, and Agmon [20] further showed that, when people 
program an agent, their decision making was closer to rational game-theoretic models than 
when interacting directly with others. Finally, a few studies [21, 22] showed that 
programming agents can improve the way people engage in negotiation and coordination 
tasks, thus, emphasizing that the act of programming can affect the way people behave. 
Collectively, these studies suggest that the particular context is critical in determining 
whether people will behave more or less fairly than they would if they were interacting 
directly. 
On the one hand, as reviewed in the previous section, findings on human 
representatives suggest that people may be less fair when acting through a representative 
because of the increased psychological distance between parties [1], [11-15].  Thus, again, we 
might expect people will program their agents to make decisions that show less concern for 
fairness than they would if interacting directly.  This leads to our first competing hypothesis: 
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Hypothesis 2a: People will show reduced fairness when tasking agents to act on their 
behalf than when interacting directly with others. 
On the other hand, another line of research suggests the very act of programming 
might reinforce social norms like fairness. Whereas real-time interactions require people to 
respond to a specific and immediate situation, programming requires the programmer to 
deliberate on all possible situations that might arise and to devise rules that consistently hold 
across all of these eventualities. Research in behavioral economics on the strategy method 
suggests that programmers will rely on social norms to help devise these rules. 
The strategy method was proposed by behavioral economists to gain greater insight 
into the strategies people use for solving social problems [47]-[50]. The idea is that in a social 
interaction, like the ultimatum game, experimental studies only reveal how a person responds 
to a specific situation (like receiving an unfair offer).  The strategy method, instead, asks 
participants to specify in advance how they would respond to all the situations they might 
possibly face. As well as providing more information, this allows researchers to investigate 
the consistency of human decisions across situations. 
As noted by researchers in peer-designed agents, there is a close correspondence 
between the strategy method and the task faced by the programmer of an agent representative 
[17-23]. In both cases, the individual must devise some strategy for how to respond across all 
eventualities the agent might face. The strategy method also offers some methodological 
advantages over literal programming. This method allows novices to focus on their strategy 
while avoiding the complications associated with programming (although at the cost of 
limiting the complexity of tasks that can be studied). 
  Research on the strategy method suggests that it can increase reliance on social 
norms. The explanation is that the act of comparing multiple possible situations encourages 
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decision-makers to be internally consistent and increases reliance on social norms as a way to 
enforce this consistency. For example, Güth and Tietz [47] showed that when people were 
asked to consider all options in the ultimatum game ahead of the actual interaction, proposers 
made more equitable offers. In a meta-analysis of the strategy method, Oosterbeek and 
colleagues [48] found use of the strategy method increases both the offered shares and the 
likelihood that unfair offers would be rejected. Blount and Bazerman [49] further noticed that 
an iterative version of the strategy method – where participants were asked whether they 
would be willing to accept a certain offer, before proceeding to the next – led to even higher 
concern for fairness than the typical strategy method – where all the options were shown at 
once2. These findings led Rauhut and Winter [52] to conclude that the strategy method is an 
ideal approach to elicit social norms from decision makers. These findings thus, lead us to the 
second competing hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2b: People will show increased fairness when tasking agents to act on 
their behalf than when interacting directly with others. 
 Moreover, because most of the evidence points towards increased fairness under the 
strategy method, when compared to direct interaction, we also tested the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Similarly to when programming agents, people would show increased 
fairness under the strategy method than through direct interaction. 
1.4. Overview of Experiments 
                                                 
2 Brandts and Charness [50], however, did not find any differences when their participants engaged in the 
prisoners’ dilemma or the chicken game under the strategy method vs. direct interaction. 
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We test these hypotheses through four experiments where participants engaged in the 
ultimatum, impunity, and negotiation tasks. Participants engaged in these tasks either directly 
or via an agent representative. Similarly, their counterpart in the ultimatum and impunity 
games were described as either another participant playing directly, or as an autonomous 
agent representing some other participant’s interests.  
In the ultimatum game [53], there are two players: a proposer and a responder. The 
proposer is given an initial endowment of money and has to decide how much to offer to the 
responder. Then, the responder has to make a decision: if the offer is accepted, both players 
get the proposed allocation; if the offer is rejected, however, no one gets anything. The 
standard rational prediction is that the proposer should offer the minimum non-zero amount, 
as the responder will always prefer to have something to nothing. In practice, people usually 
offer 40 to 50 percent of the initial endowment and low offers (about 20 percent of the 
endowment) are usually rejected [54]. This behavior is usually explained by a concern with 
fairness and a fear of being rejected [55]. 
The impunity game is similar to the ultimatum game [56]. The proposer is given an 
initial endowment of money and makes an offer to a responder, who must decide whether to 
accept or reject the offer. The critical difference is that, if the offer is rejected, the responder 
gets zero, but the proposer still keeps the money s/he designated for her-/himself. A rejection 
by the responder, thus, does not impact the proposer’s payoff and is only symbolic. The 
impunity game can therefore be seen as a version of the ultimatum game where responders 
are given less power over the outcome. Experimental results with this game show that 
proposers tend to offer less than in the ultimatum game, though still above the rational 
prediction of zero [56]. The rationale for exploring the impunity game was to understand if 
people would still care about fairness when interacting with agents when no strategic 
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considerations were at play – i.e., when participants did not have to fear losing their share if 
their offers were rejected3.  
The negotiation task consisted of a typical multi-issue bargaining setting in which 
participants engaged in multiple rounds with the counterpart until an agreement was reached, 
or time expired. The motivation for exploring this task was to test whether the findings in the 
previous games generalize to a more realistic and complex setting. 
When studying agents that represent humans, it is important to clarify how much 
autonomy is given to these agents. On one extreme, the decisions made by the agent can be 
fully specified by the human owner; on the other extreme, the agent could make the decision 
by itself with minimal input from its owner. The degree of autonomy is an important factor 
that is likely to influence the way people behave with agents. Research in social decision 
making demonstrates that the degree of thought and intentionality behind a decision can have 
a deep impact on people’s reactions [57-59]. For instance, people are much more likely to 
accept an unfair offer from someone who had to make a random decision than from someone 
who chose out of his or her own volition. In this paper, nevertheless, we leave this factor for 
future work and, instead, focus on agents that have a minimal amount of autonomy. Thus, our 
agents will make decisions that are completely specified by the humans they represent. We 
feel this is a good starting point as it is important to understand whether interacting with 
agents impact people’s behavior, even when they have minimal autonomy. Earlier research 
has, in fact, demonstrated that, independently of the actual decision, the mere belief about 
                                                 
3 The dictator game is another variant of the ultimatum game where the responder always has to accept what the 
proposer offers and, in this case, isn’t even allowed to make a symbolic rejection. The responder, thus, has the 
least amount of power among the three games. However, since the responder – human or agent – doesn’t have to 
make any decision, we consider the dictator game to be out of scope for our research objectives. 
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whether you are interacting with an agent was sufficient to create a powerful effect on 
people’s decision making [35], [42], [43]. 
In Experiment 1, participants engaged in the ultimatum and impunity games in the 
role of proposers. The results revealed that people showed more fairness with humans than 
with agents representing others; however, people acted more fairly when engaging via agents 
than when interacting directly with others. In Experiment 2, participants engaged in the same 
games, but this time in the role of responders. The results showed that people were less 
willing to accept unfair offers when engaging via agents than when interacting directly with 
others, thus reinforcing that people show higher concern for fairness when programming 
agents. In Experiment 3, we focused on mechanism and showed that programming agents is 
similar to the strategy method, whereby participants report their decisions ahead of the actual 
interaction with the counterpart. This experiment revealed that, if participants were asked to 
report their decisions ahead of time, then they showed higher concern for fairness, just like 
they did when programming an agent. Finally, in Experiment 4, participants engaged in 
negotiation either directly or via an agent representative. The counterpart in this game 
consistently made tough unfair offers. Similarly to the earlier findings, the results revealed 
that people were less likely to reach an agreement or concede to the unfair counterpart when 
acting via an agent, than when interacting directly. 
2. Experiment 1 
2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Design 
The experiment followed a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed factorial design: Responder (Human vs. 
Agent; between-participants) × Proposer (Interaction through an agent vs. Direct interaction 
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with counterpart; between-participants) × Power (Ultimatum game vs. Impunity game; 
within-participants). Participants were assigned to one of the four possible Proposer × 
Responder conditions, and played one round of the ultimatum game and one round of the 
impunity game. The order for the games was counterbalanced across participants. Before 
engaging in the actual games, participants read the instructions, were quizzed on the 
instructions, and completed a tutorial. The interface was also different for these games in 
terms of colors and icons on screen to make sure people did not confuse the two games.  
Participants always engaged in the role of proposers. They were ostensibly told that 
this assignment was random. In each game, participants were given an initial endowment of 
20 tickets. They could make an offer ranging from 0 to 20 tickets. These tickets had financial 
consequences as they would enter lotteries (one per game) worth $304.  
The experiment was fully anonymous for the participants. To accomplish this, human 
counterparts were referred to as “anonymous” and we never collected any information that 
could identify the participants. Agents were referred to as “computer agents”. To preserve 
anonymity with respect to the experimenters, we relied on the anonymity system of the online 
pool we used – Amazon Mechanical Turk. When interacting with participants, researchers are 
                                                 
4 We adopted a financial incentive based on lottery for two reasons: (1) it simplified the procedure of paying 
participants based on performance, and (2) we felt that the possibility of earning a big reward would be more 
appealing to our participants than an alternative mechanism that would give a guaranteed but lower reward 
based on performance. Regarding the viability of using lotteries, in one (unpublished) study, we compared 
people's decisions in a dictator game under the lottery system vs. direct pay. The results showed no differences 
between the financial incentives. Starmer and Sugden [60] acknowledge, however, the possibility of a bias when 
using financial incentives that rely on lotteries but, nevertheless, point out that "experimental researchers need 
not be too concerned about this particular problem" (pg. 978) as this bias, if it exists, is minimal. Finally, 
because people treat probabilities differently, there is the chance that people would value the actual 
(probabilistic) worth of a ticket differently than what it really is. This is also unlikely to be problematic for our 
purposes, as Camerer and Hogarth [61] note that the size of the incentive does not play a decisive role on 
whether an effect occurs in standard decision games such as the ones explored here. 
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never able to identify the participants, unless they explicitly ask for information that may 
serve to identify them (e.g., name or photo), which we did not. 
2.1.2. Responders 
Participants were told that responders were either other participants or agents that 
would make decisions on behalf of other participants. They were also informed that they 
would play with a different counterpart in each game (i.e., they would play at most once with 
the same human or agent counterpart). In reality, however, independently of counterpart type, 
participants always engaged with a responder that followed the same script: if offer greater or 
equal than 10 tickets, accept; if offer 8 or 9 tickets, accept with a 75% chance; if offer 
between 4 and 7 tickets, accept with a 25% chance; otherwise, reject. Using this form of 
deception is common when studying people’s decision making with humans vs. computers 
[38], [40], [41-44], [62-64], as it provides increased experimental control. The procedure was 
also approved by our University's Institutional Review Board. To make this manipulation 
believable, we had people connect to a fictitious server before starting the task for the 
purposes of “being matched with other participants”. Connecting to this server took 
approximately 30-45 seconds. After concluding the experiment, participants were fully 
debriefed about the manipulation.  
2.1.3. Proposers 
 Participants interacted directly with their counterparts or programmed an agent that 
would act on the participants’ behalf. In the latter case, before starting the task, participants 
were asked to program their agents to make the offer they wanted, as shown in Fig. 1. As 
discussed in Section 1.4, these agents had minimal autonomy. 
2.1.4. Participants 
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We recruited 197 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Amazon Mechanical 
Turk, which is a crowdsourcing platform that allows people to complete online tasks in 
exchange for pay. Previous research shows that studies performed on Mechanical Turk can 
yield high-quality data, minimize experimental biases, and successfully replicate the results 
of behavioral studies performed on traditional pools [65]. We only sampled participants from 
the United States with an excellent performance history (95% approval rate in previous 
Mechanical Turk tasks). Regarding gender, 51.3% of the participants were males. Age 
distribution was as follows: 22 to 34 years, 61.5%; 35 to 44 years, 25.6%; 45 to 54 years, 
8.2%; 55 to 64 years, 3.6%; over 65 years, 1.0%. Professional backgrounds were quite 
diverse. Participants were paid $2.00 for their participation. This and all experiments 
presented here were approved by the Internal Review Board at USC (ID# UP-14-00177). In 
all experiments, participants gave their informed consent and were debriefed, at the end, 
about the experimental procedure. 
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Fig. 1. Programming an agent to make offers in Experiment 1. 
2.2. Results 
The results for this experiment are shown in Fig. 2. To analyze this data, we ran a 
Responder × Proposer × Power mixed ANOVA. The results showed a main effect of 
Responder, with people offering more to humans (M = 7.27, SE = .29) than to agents 
representing others (M = 6.34, SE = .29), F(1, 193) = 5.20, p = .024, partial η2 = .026. This 
result supports our Hypothesis 1. The results also showed a main effect of Proposer with 
people offering more when programming agents (M = 7.22, SE = .29) than when interacting 
directly with their counterparts (M = 6.39, SE = .29), F(1, 193) = 4.17, p = .043, partial η2 = 
.021. This result, thus, supports Hypothesis 2b and contradicts Hypothesis 2a. Finally, 
regarding the power manipulation, there was a main effect with people offering more in the 
ultimatum (M = 8.27, SE = .17) than in the impunity game (M = 5.34, SE = .32), F(1, 193) = 
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95.39, p < .001, partial η2 = .331. This result is in line with earlier findings that show that 
people offer more in the ultimatum than in the impunity game, even though in both cases the 
offers are well above the minimum non-zero offers predicted by game theory [56]. 
 
Fig. 2. Participant offers in Experiment 1. 
2.3.  Discussion 
The results revealed an interesting finding: people behave differently with agents that 
act on others’ behalf than with agents that act on the participant's behalf. In the former case, 
in line with research suggesting that increased psychological distance reduces concerns for 
fairness [11-15], participants made lower offers to agents acting on behalf of others than to 
humans. However, in the latter case, participants showed increased concern for fairness and 
made offers that were closer to the fair even-split when programming agents, than when 
interacting directly with others. In line with our Hypothesis 2b, the results suggest that there 
is a separate psychological mechanism at play; specifically, programming an agent to act on 
the participant’s behalf may have led participants to think more deliberatively and focus on 
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the longer-term consequences of their actions. This, in turn, led participants to behave more 
fairly. If this is the case, then people should also show higher concern for fairness when 
interacting via agents in the role of responder. We tested this contention in the next 
experiment. 
3. Experiment 2 
In this experiment, participants engaged as responders in the ultimatum and impunity 
games. The proposers, which were either human or agents acting on behalf of others, always 
made unfair offers. Moreover, participants engaged directly with their counterparts or 
programmed agents to act on their behalf. Following the results in the previous experiment, 
our expectation was that people would show higher concern for fairness when acting through 
agents than when interacting directly with others.  
Regarding the effect of counterpart type – human vs. agent representing another 
participant – the existing evidence is subtle. Sanfey et al. [44] showed that people were more 
willing to accept unfair offers from computers than from humans in the ultimatum game. 
They further argued that this happened because people experienced more negative emotion 
when receiving an unfair offer from the human than from the computer. However, their 
experimental manipulation did not clarify whether computers were acting randomly or 
according to algorithms that simulated human behavior. This may have introduced a 
confound that led people to experience less negative emotion because they believed 
computers were simply not acting intentionally, rather than because they were not human. 
Effectively, there is considerable research showing that people are more accepting of unfair 
outcomes when they believe the counterpart did not intend to act unfairly [57-59]. Yu et al. 
[13], on the other hand, suggest that people are more willing to accept unfair offers from 
friends than from strangers; in other words, in this case, increasing perceived psychological 
Appears in Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (2017) 
 
21 
 
distance lowered acceptance rate. According to them, people follow social scripts when 
engaging with friends and, consequently, are more willing to sacrifice a short-term reward to 
preserve the relationship. Finally, in a more directly relevant experiment to our case, de Melo 
et al. [43] showed that when computers were explicitly described as acting “intentionally, just 
like other people” and when the counterpart was a stranger – i.e., not an acquaintance or 
friend – people were just as likely to accept unfair offers from humans as from computers. 
According to their evidence, people were more likely to experience guilt when acting with 
humans than computers and, thus, made fairer offers to humans (similarly to our findings in 
Experiment 1); in contrast, people experienced just as much envy when receiving unfair 
offers from humans as from computers and, thus, there was no difference in acceptance rate. 
In our experiment, therefore, we expected people to be just as likely to accept unfair offers 
from humans as from agents representing others. 
Finally, regarding the power manipulation, Yamagishi et al. [56] found that people 
were more likely to accept unfair offers in the impunity than in the ultimatum game, though 
in both cases rejection rate was considerably higher than the rational prediction that people 
should accept any offer above zero. Thus, we expected that people would be more likely to 
accept unfair offers from (human or agent) counterparts in the impunity than in the ultimatum 
game, but these acceptance rates would be lower than the rational prediction. 
3.1. Method 
The experiment followed a 2 × 2 × 2 mixed factorial design: Responder (Interaction 
through an agent vs. Direct interaction with counterpart; between-participants) × Proposer 
(Human vs. Agent; between-participants) × Power (Ultimatum game vs. Impunity game; 
within-participants). Participants always assumed the role of responders, and proposers 
always made an unfair offer, which consisted of either 2 or 3 lottery tickets (out of an initial 
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endowment of 20 tickets). Regarding the procedure for programming agents, participants 
were asked to report their decision for each possible offer, as shown in Fig. 3. The procedure 
was, otherwise, similar to Experiment 1. 
 The main measure was the acceptance rate for the unfair offers. In exploratory 
fashion, we introduced a scale to measure perceived psychological distance. This subjective 
measure was intended to help tease apart the mechanisms at play when people interact with 
agents acting on behalf of others vs. agents acting on the participant's behalf. The scale 
consisted of eight classification questions based on definitions of psychological distance from 
other researchers (scale ranged from 1, Not at all, to 7, Very much):  
1. How much do you feel you would be able to relate to your counterpart? [66] 
2. How likely would it be for your counterpart to belong to the same social groups as 
you? [66] 
3. How much do you feel your counterpart would be a stranger to you? [11]  
4. How much do you feel you may come to know your counterpart? [11]  
5. Considering potential future interactions with this person [67]: a. How likely do 
you feel you could become a close personal friend with your counterpart? b. How accepting 
would you be of having your counterpart as a neighbor in your street? c. How likely do you 
feel you would be able to work in the same place as your counterpart?  
6. Considering your social network of friends (and friends of friends, and so on), how 
likely would it be for your counterpart to become closer to you? [12] 
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Fig. 3. Programming an agent to accept or reject an offer in Experiment 2. 
We recruited 198 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. We only sampled 
participants from the United States with an excellent performance history (95% approval rate 
in previous Mechanical Turk tasks). Regarding gender, 55.1% of the participants were males. 
Age distribution was as follows: 21 and Under, 3.0%; 22 to 34 years,  53.0%; 35 to 44 years, 
25.3%; 45 to 54 years, 11.6%; 55 to 64 years, 5.1%; over 65 years, 2.0%. Professional 
backgrounds were quite diverse. Participants were paid $2.00 for their participation.  
3.2. Results 
The acceptance rates for this experiment are shown in Fig. 4. To analyze this measure 
we ran a Responder × Proposer × Power mixed ANOVA. The results revealed a main effect 
of responder, with people being less likely to accept unfair offers when programming agents 
(M = .39, SE = .04) than when interacting directly with their counterparts (M = .62, SE = .04), 
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F(1, 195) = 18.89, p < .001, partial η2 = .088. The results, thus, confirmed our prediction. The 
analysis also showed, as expected, no statistically significant effect of proposer, i.e., people 
were just as likely to accept unfair offers from humans (M = .50, SE = .04) as from agents 
acting on behalf of others (M = .52, SE = .04), F(1, 195) = .143, p = .706. Finally, the results 
confirmed a main effect of power, with people being less likely to accept unfair offers in the 
ultimatum game (M = .32, SE = .03) than in the impunity game (M = .69, SE = .03), F(1, 195) 
= 98.74, p < .001, partial η2 = .336.  
 
Fig. 4. Participant acceptance rates in Experiment 2. 
To analyze perceptions of psychological distance we first averaged the questions in 
our scale. Then, we ran a Responder × Proposer × Power mixed ANOVA on the averaged 
measure (Cronbach’s α = 0.89). The results showed that people perceived higher 
psychological distance to their counterparts when programming agents (M = 3.20, SE = .11) 
than when interacting directly (M = 2.70, SE = .11), F(1, 194) = 12.20, p = .001, partial η2 = 
.059. However, the results showed that even though actual social distance between human 
and agent counterparts was different, there was no statistically significant difference in 
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perceived psychological distance: people perceived human counterparts (M = 2.89, SE = .11) 
to be just as distant as agent counterparts (M = 2.97, SE = .11), F(1, 194) = .28, p = .600.  
3.3.  Discussion 
This experiment confirmed that people show higher concern for fairness when 
programming agents, when compared to direct interaction with others. Even when 
participants had little power, as in the impunity game, they were less likely to accept an 
unfair offer when acting through agents. Moreover, this effect occurred despite the fact that 
programming agents increased the perceived psychological distance to the counterpart. In 
contrast, there was no difference in perceived distance between human or agent counterparts, 
which may explain why people were just as likely to accept unfair offers from humans as 
from agents. The experiment, therefore, reinforces that there are two complementary, yet 
separate, mechanisms at play. When engaging with agents that represent others, in line with 
earlier findings [11-15], people show less concern for fairness, but only if psychological 
distance is perceived to be higher. In contrast, despite increasing perceived psychological 
distance, programming agents to act with others leads people to show higher concern for 
fairness. We propose this is happening because people adopt a more deliberative and broader 
perspective in virtue of having to program their decisions ahead of time. This mechanism is 
tested in our third experiment.  
4. Experiment 3 
We argue that programming an agent to act on our behalf leads people to deliberate 
on all possible situations that might arise and to devise rules that consistently hold across all 
of these eventualities; this, in turn, leads them to act more fairly. In this experiment, we 
introduced an experimental condition where participants were asked to think about all the 
possible outcomes of the game ahead of time and self-report their decision before interacting 
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with their (human or agent) counterparts. In experimental economics, this procedure is 
usually referred to as the strategy method [47-50], [52] and, as pointed out in the 
Introduction, research on peer-designed agents had already noted the similarities [17-23]. 
Since this method relates to the process people go through when programming their agents, 
we expected people to show just as high concern for fairness in this condition as when 
programming agents (Hypothesis 3). The main difference with respect to Experiment 2, 
though, is that no agent representatives are involved in the strategy method; i.e., participants 
are essentially interacting directly with their counterparts, except they are not doing so in 
real-time. 
4.1. Method 
In this experiment, participants engaged in the ultimatum and impunity games as 
responders. The experiment was identical to the previous experiment, except that we 
introduced a third responder condition; thus, we followed a 3 × 2 × 2 mixed factorial design: 
Responder (Interaction through agent vs. Strategy method vs. Direct interaction; between-
participants) × Proposer (Human vs. Agent; between-participants) × Power (Ultimatum game 
vs. Impunity game; within-participants). In the critical new responder condition, participants 
were told they would be interacting with (human or agent) counterparts; however, before 
starting the task, they were asked to report their decision ahead of time. To accomplish this, 
they were shown a screen where they had to report whether they would accept each of the 
possible offers (from 0 to 20 tickets) from their counterparts (Fig. 5). 
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 Fig. 5. Participants report their decision via the strategy method in Experiment 3. Notice that 
the instructions simply ask participants to report their decisions in advance rather than to 
"customize their agent representative", as in Experiment 2. 
We recruited 300 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. We only sampled 
participants from the United States with an excellent performance history (95% approval rate 
in previous Mechanical Turk tasks). Regarding gender, 52.3% of the participants were males. 
Age distribution was as follows: 21 and Under, 4.3%; 22 to 34 years, 52.3%; 35 to 44 years, 
24.7%; 45 to 54 years, 11.7%; 55 to 64 years, 5.3%; over 65 years, 1.7%. Professional 
backgrounds were quite diverse. Participants were paid $2.00 for their participation.  
4.2. Results and Discussion 
The results for this experiment are shown in in Fig. 6. To analyze acceptance rate we 
ran a Responder × Proposer × Power mixed ANOVA. The results showed a main effect of 
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responder: people were less likely to accept unfair offers when programming agents (M = .45, 
SE = .04) or when engaging via the strategy method (M = .46, SE = .04) than when engaging 
directly with their counterparts (M = .60, SE = .04), F(1, 294) = 5.24, p = .006, partial η2 = 
.034. Bonferroni post-hoc tests confirmed that there was a significant difference in 
acceptance rate between: interacting through agents and direct interaction (p = .018); 
interacting via the strategy method and direct interaction (p = .018); however, there was no 
statistically significant difference between interacting through agents and the strategy method 
(p = 1.000). These results, thus, confirmed our Hypothesis 3. The results also replicated 
Experiment 2’s non-effect of proposer: people were just as likely to accept unfair offers from 
humans (M = .51, SE = .03) as from agents acting on behalf of others (M = .49, SE = .03), 
F(1, 294) = .188, p = .665. Finally, the results confirmed a main effect of Power, with people 
being less likely to accept unfair offers in the ultimatum game (M = .32, SE = .03) than in the 
impunity game (M = .65, SE = .03), F(1, 294) = 69.88, p < .001, partial η2 = .192. 
 
Fig. 6. Participant acceptance rates in Experiment 3. 
 
 
5. Experiment 4 
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In this final experiment we wanted to test whether the finding that people show 
increased fairness when acting via an agent representative would generalize to a more 
complex setting. We chose a typical multi-issue negotiation task. The counterpart, who was 
the first mover, always made tough unfair offers and our research question was: Would 
people be less likely to reach an agreement when negotiating with an unfair counterpart? 
Grosz et al. [19] had already suggested that in the colored trails game – a domain that has 
many similarities to negotiation under an alternating offers protocol – people were more 
likely to be demanding when programming agents than when interacting directly with others. 
Moreover, following the results in the earlier experiments, we hypothesized: 
 Hypothesis 4: People will be less likely to reach agreement and be more demanding 
with a tough unfair negotiator when acting via an agent representative than when 
engaging directly. 
5.1. Method 
In this task, participants played the role of a seller of a consignment of mobile phones 
whose goal is to negotiate three issues: the price, the warranty period and the duration of the 
financing contract of the phones [68, 69]. Each issue had 9 levels, being the highest level the 
most valuable for the participant, and the lowest level the least valuable – see Table 1. Level 
1 on price ($110) yielded 0 points and level 9 ($150) yielded 400 points (i.e., each level 
corresponded to a 50 point increment). Level 1 on warranty (9 months) yielded 0 points and 
level 9 (1 month) yielded 120 points (i.e., each level corresponded to a 15 point increment). 
Finally, for duration of financing contract, level 1 (1 month) yielded 0 points, and level 9 (9 
months) yielded 240 points (i.e., each level corresponded to a 30 point increment). It was 
pointed out to participants that the best deal was, thus, 9-9-9 for a total outcome of 760 points 
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(400 + 120 + 240). The participant was also told that the counterpart had a different payoff 
table which was not known. The negotiation proceeded according to the alternating offers 
protocol, being the counterpart the first to make an offer. Finally, the participant was 
informed that the negotiation would proceed until one player accepted the offer or time 
expired. If no agreement was reached by the end of round 6, negotiation always terminated 
[68, 69], but participants were not aware of how many rounds the negotiation lasted a priori. 
Participants were told that they would engage in this task with another participant; 
however, for experimental control, participants always saw the same scripted sequence of 
offers: 1-1-2, 1-2-2, 2-2-1, 2-2-2, 2-2-3, and 2-3-3. This was a low concession sequence, 
where the first offer was only worth 30 points, and the last offer was worth 160 points. Thus, 
the counterpart would not concede more than 30 points in each round. 
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Table 1. The issues and payoffs for the negotiation task 
Price 
 
Warranty Financing Duration 
Level Price Payoff Level Months Payoff Level Months Payoff 
9 150 USD 400 points  9 1 month 120 points  9 9 
months 
240 points
8 145 USD 350 points  8 2 months 105 points  8 8 
months 
210 points
7 140 USD 300 points  7 3 months 90 points  7 7 
months 
180 points
6 135 USD 250 points  6 4 months 75 points  6 6 
months 
150 points
5 130 USD 200 points  5 5 months 60 points  5 5 
months 
120 points
4 125 USD 150 points  4 6 months 45 points  4 4 
months 
90 points 
3 120 USD 100 points  3 7 months 30 points  3 3 
months 
60 points 
2 115 USD 50 points  2 8 months 15 points  2 2 
months 
30 points 
1 110 USD 0 points  1 9 months 0 points  1 1 month 0 points 
 
To program the agent representative, participants were told that they would “teach 
their computer agent by instructing how it should decide on example offers” and, then, “using 
machine learning techniques, the agent would be able to extrapolate from those offers, how to 
decide in any situation”. Participants were asked to provide a decision – either to accept or 
make a counteroffer – for three example cases in each round, for a total of 7 rounds. The 
seventh round was labeled "round 7 or beyond". Figure 6 shows a screenshot of the software 
used for this procedure. Importantly, the three cases in each round corresponded to three 
different concession levels, similarly to the procedure in Van Kleef et al.'s experiment [68]: 
low, medium, and high concession. These offers are shown in Table 2. Notice that the 
example offers for the first six rounds in the low concession pattern are exactly the same 
offers that the counterpart would present in the actual negotiation. Thus, this procedure 
allowed for direct comparison of the decisions participants made when engaged directly vs. 
via an agent representative.  
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Table 2. The offers for the low, medium, and high concession examples, when programming 
the agent representative 
Low Concession Medium Concession High Concession 
Round Offer Payoff Round Offer Payoff Round Offer Payoff 
1 1-1-2 30  1 2-1-2 80  1 2-2-2 95 
2 1-2-2 45  2 2-3-2 110  2 2-45-3 155 
3 2-2-1 65  3 2-3-4 170  3 3-5-3 220 
4 2-2-2 95  4 3-3-4 220  4 3-5-5 280 
5 2-2-3 125  5 3-4-5 265  5 4-6-5 345 
6 2-3-3 140  6 4-4-5 315  6 4-8-6 405 
7+ 3-3-2 160  7+ 4-5-6 360  7+ 5-9-6 470 
 
We focused on three behavioral measures: (1) Whether an agreement was reached; (2) 
Demand difference between the first and the last round. Demand is defined as the total amount 
of points when summed across the three issues; (3) Demand in the last round. 
 
Fig. 6. Participants programmed their agents to negotiate in their behalf by providing example 
decisions to different sets of offers. 
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We recruited 96 participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. We only sampled 
participants from the United States with an excellent performance history (95% approval rate 
in previous Mechanical Turk tasks). Regarding gender, 48.5% of the participants were males. 
Age distribution was as follows: 21 and Under, 3.1%; 22 to 34 years, 59.4%; 35 to 44 years, 
20.6%; 45 to 54 years, 11.5%; 55 to 64 years, 5.2%. Professional backgrounds were quite 
diverse. Regarding incentive, first, participants were paid $2.00 for their participation; then, 
participants were informed that the points earned in the negotiation would be converted into 
lottery tickets for a $30 cash prize. However, if no agreement was reached or time expired, no 
tickets would be given. 
5.2. Results and Discussion 
To analyze our data, we ran independent samples t-tests on agreement, demand difference, and 
demand in last round. The means and standard errors for these measures are shown in Figure 
7. The results showed that participants were less likely to reach an agreement via agent 
representatives (M = .23, SD = .43) than when interacting directly (M = .44, SD = .50), t(93) = 
-2.13, p = .036, r = .215. Participants were also less likely to concede over time – i.e., had a 
lower demand difference – when engaging via agents (M = 80.00, SD = 180.40) than when 
engaging directly (M = 265.63, SD = 243.57), t(93) = -4.25, p = .000, r = .403. Finally, 
participants' last offer was more demanding when acting via agents (M = 484.04, SD = 302.98) 
than when engaging directly (M = 306.67, SD = 303.41), t(93) = 2.85, p = .005, r = .284. Thus, 
all measures supported our Hypothesis 4 that people were more demanding to unfair 
counterparts when acting via agent representatives. 
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Fig. 7. Results in Experiment 4: A) Percentage of participants that reached an agreement; B) 
Demand difference; C) Demand in the last round. Error bars represent standard errors. 
 
6. General Discussion 
At a time when there is increased interest in autonomous agents that represent 
humans, this paper sheds light on the impact these agent representatives have on people’s 
social behavior. The main finding is that people show higher concern for fairness when 
programming agents to act with others, when compared to direct interaction with others. In 
the ultimatum game, people made offers that were closer to the fair even-split option when 
engaging through agents than when interacting directly with others. This pattern was 
sustained even when the counterpart had little power, as is the case of the impunity game. 
Moreover, when faced with unfair offers, people were more likely to reject them if 
programming an agent than if interacting directly with others. We proposed this happens 
because, when people program an agent to act on their behalf, they adopt a broader and more 
Appears in Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (2017) 
 
36 
 
deliberative perspective of the situation which, in turn, leads people to behave more fairly. 
Effectively, when people were asked to consider all possible outcomes and report their 
decision before interacting with their counterparts – similarly to what they do when they 
program their agents – they showed a higher concern for fairness, just like they did when 
acting through agents. 
6.1. Theoretical Implications 
This explanation seems aligned with findings in the construal level theory literature 
[70, 71]. According to this theory, when people mentally represent or construe a situation at a 
higher level, they tend to focus on more abstract and global aspects of the situation; in 
contrast, when people construe a situation at a lower level, they tend to focus on more 
specific context-dependent aspects of the situation. Building on this theory, Agerström and 
Björklund [72, 73] argued that, since moral principles are generally represented at a more 
abstract level than selfish motives, moral behaviors should be perceived as more important 
with greater temporal distance from the moral dilemma; though see [74] for a dissenting 
view. In separate studies, they showed that people made harsher moral judgments of others’ 
distant-future morally questionable behavior [72] and, that people were more likely to 
commit to moral behavior when thinking about distant versus near future events [73]. In a 
social dilemma, Kortenkamp and Moore [75] also showed that individuals with a chronic 
concern for an abstract level of construal – i.e., who were high in consideration for the future 
consequences of their behavior – showed higher levels of cooperation. Finally, in a 
negotiation setting, Henderson et al. [76] and De Dreu et al. [77] showed that individuals 
under high construal level negotiated more mutually beneficial and integrative agreements. 
Therefore, it is possible that programming agents led participants to construe the situation 
more abstractly, which then led to increased fairness.  
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One alternative explanation is that people behaved fairly when programming agents 
because they were concerned with their social image or reputation. In line with earlier 
research showing that people act more fairly out of a concern for their reputation [78-80], 
some may have assumed that participants behaved fairly to avoid a costly negative reputation. 
We advance one critical reason why we believe this was not the case: participants were 
informed that the interaction was fully anonymous. Therefore, participants were effectively 
shielded from any negative consequences that could ensue from their decisions. However, the 
idea that a concern for social image impacts how we program our agents is rather plausible 
and, even though it may not apply in our case, is an interesting venue for future research. 
Another alternative explanation is that people behaved more fairly when 
programming agents because these are a persistent representation that is typically designed to 
act on one’s behalf across multiple encounters and with multiple counterparts. Thus, the 
argument is that people act more fairly when programming agents because that makes sense, 
from a rational point of view, when considering multiple interactions [81]. However, we 
argue this alternative is unlikely to explain the behavior of our participants for one important 
reason: participants were informed that they would interact with each (human or agent) 
counterpart at most once and, thus, there was no opportunity for repeated interaction. 
Our results also show that people tend to favor humans to agents acting on behalf of 
others in their decisions. This result is compatible with earlier findings showing that people 
favored humans to computers in economic settings [38-43] and with research suggesting that 
increased psychological distance to the counterpart leads to reduced cooperation and fairness 
[11-15].  
The paper also demonstrates that computers are not strictly necessary to achieve 
increased fairness. In Experiment 3, by replicating aspects of the process of programming an 
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agent, we were able to increase concern for fairness, even though no actual agents were 
involved. Nevertheless, it still remains to be determined whether human agents would lead to 
the same effects as computer agents. Research suggests that introducing human agents can, 
indeed, impact people behavior [82]. However, whether “programming” a human to act on 
one’s behalf is the same as programming a computer agent is left as future work. 
Finally, in this paper we focused on fairness as measured by behavior in two standard 
decision making tasks – the ultimatum and impunity game. However, it is important to 
inquire whether these findings generalize to other more complex domains. On the one hand, 
in negotiation – which can be interpreted as a more complex version of the ultimatum game 
[4, 53] – we showed that participants were also likely to be more demanding with unfair 
counterparts when interacting via agents than when engaging with them directly. On the other 
hand, in the trust-revenge game, Azaria, Richardson, and Rosenfeld [83] report no difference 
in trusting and a slight increase in revenge behavior when programming agents, when 
compared to direct interaction with others. Though the revenge portion of this task may seem 
similar to an ultimatum game, it is important to note that here it reflects a breach in trust, 
whereas in the ultimatum game there is no initial allocation of trust. Moreover, in their 
experiments, agents interacted with agents, whereas humans interacted with humans; i.e., 
there was no experimental condition in which agents interacted with humans. This difference 
is important because research suggests that people are more likely to punish trust violations 
from in-group (i.e., humans) than from out-groups (i.e., agents) [84]. In sum, care should be 
taken when comparing and generalizing to behavior in different tasks. 
6.2. Practical and Ethical Implications 
A first reading of our findings could suggest that there is a double disadvantage in 
tasking an agent to interact with other humans: on the one hand, people are likely to be fairer 
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– and, thus, less selfish – when programming their agents; on the other hand, others would be 
less likely to treat these agents as favorably as real people. However, instead, we see our 
current findings as introducing two opportunities. First, earlier research [43] suggested that 
what needs to be addressed in order to have humans treat agents that represent others as fairly 
as humans is to reduce the perceived psychological distance to the agents. This can be 
achieved by emphasizing the presence of the human for whom the agent is working for or, 
alternatively, by emphasizing shared group membership or common values. In support of this 
view, previous research demonstrates that people cooperate and trust more agents that are 
perceived to share salient physical characteristics – e.g., race [28] – or with which a 
“common fate” is shared – e.g., when engaging in a task as teammates [26].  
The second opportunity is that acting through agents can increase the motivation for 
fairness. The implication is that interaction between agents and humans has the potential to 
increase fairness in society, when compared to the current state-of-affairs in human-human 
interaction. Because agents do not suffer from the typical constraints we see in humans (e.g., 
bounded rationality), we already knew that it was possible to use them to increase efficiency 
in terms of standard economics metrics, such as pareto-optimality [6], [7]. Here, we propose 
that agents also have the potential to enhance the kind of social considerations we see in 
humans [78] – fairness, cooperation, altruism, reciprocity, etc. – by virtue of motivating 
designers and human users to consider more carefully the broader implications of their 
decisions.  
The results in this paper can be applied across several domains. For agents that make 
decisions on behalf of humans – such as automated negotiatiors [6], [7] – the 
recommendation is that, as discussed above, designers should allow human users to 
customize their agents. This is likely to lead users to show higher concern for reaching a fair 
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decision. These results are also not limited to software agents. As robots get immersed into 
society [85], the guidelines proposed here for optimizing decision making should be relevant 
to human-robot interaction. As discussed next, the results also have implications for 
designing autonomous agents such as self-driving cars or unmanned flying vehicles. 
Recently, there has been considerable concern about allowing autonomous agents to 
take their place in society. People are naturally reluctant to let automated vehicles drive on 
their streets [86] and for unmanned aerial vehicles to transport goods above our heads [87] or 
apply lethal force in war [88]. However, experimental work such as the one presented here 
provides critical insight into the psychological mechanisms driving people’s behavior with 
these agents and, consequently, suggest ways for understanding and determining the 
appropriate response to these concerns. According to our results, on the one hand, people 
may react harshly when something goes wrong because of these vehicles; on the other hand, 
if given the opportunity, designers and users will likely strive to program these agents 
according to their best driving or flying practices.  Overall, reducing perceived psychological 
distance with autonomous agents and motivating a broader and more deliberative perspective 
when designing them is likely to pave the way for better and fairer human-agent interaction 
across various domains. 
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